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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARILYN R. HALES, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ] 
vs. ) 
DR. J. JAY OLDROYD M.D., ] 
DR. NOLAN MONEY M.D., ] 
Defendants and Appellees. ' 
> APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
) Court of Appeal's #990288-CA 
1 Priority Number 15 ^ 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-
2a-3(j) Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Issues Presented 
1. Did the lower court err in dismissing plaintiffs complaint and cause of actions 
against Dr. Oldroyd and Dr. Money as a discovery sanction pursuant to Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 37(d) [A-l] where the plaintiff did not fail to respond to 
defendants' discovery demands made pursuant to Rule 34 [A-5] and did not violate any 
discovery order of the court? 
2. Did the lower court err in dismissing plaintiffs complaint and cause of action 
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as a discovery sanction because the defendants filed Motions to Compel concerning the 
informally requested medical release forms, [A-24,25,29,30, 64 & 65] where the Utah 
Rules of Discovery do not provide for such a manner and means of discovery? 
3. Did the lower court err in dismissing plaintiffs complaint as a discovery 
sanction where defendant's informal request for medical release forms did not conform to 
the rules of pleading and the defendants did not follow discovery procedures provided for 
in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or the Utah Code of Judicial Administration? 
4. Did the lower court err in dismissing plaintiffs complaint against Dr. Oldroyd 
and Dr. Money as a discovery sanction because early in the case it had dismissed 
plaintiffs independent cause of action against another defendant, Mt. View Hospital, as 
a sanction for not fully answering written interrogatories filed by Mt. View? 
5. Did the lower court err in dismissing plaintiffs complaint as a sanction because 
the plaintiff invoked her attorney client/ privilege when defendants noticed up the 
deposition of a former attorney of hers to question him about his consultations with her in 
private about legal matters? 
6. Did the lower court err in dismissing plaintiffs complaint as a sanction where 
the delays in the case were caused by defendants unfounded motion practices and not 
discovery violations by the plaintiff? 
7. Was plaintiffs Federal and State constitutional rights to her day in court 
violated by the lower court's dismissal of her complaint as a discovery sanction under the 
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true facts and discovery procedures followed by the defendants in this case? 
II. Standards of Review 
A. These issue were preserved in the trial court in Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside 
the Court's Order Dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint, [R 1467] and Plaintiffs Reply 
Memorandum to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Set 
Aside Order Dismissing Plaintiff s Complaint, [R 1670]. 
B. The atpparent standard of review for these issues is abuse of discretion, 938 
P.2d 271, Morton v. Continental Baking Co., (Utah 1997).1 However it is respectfully 
submitted that the Court of Appeals should use a correction of an error standard in this 
case because as will be shown in this Brief the lower court acted outside the pasture of 
discretion allowed him under the rules of discovery and therefore his errors were of law, 
and not discretion. [See footnote 1.] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L Nature of the case. 
This is a medical malpractice case resulting from two surgeries performed by the 
defendants on the plaintiff s digestive tract. 
IL Course of Proceedings. 
1Morton suggest that discovery sanctions are within the discretion of the trial court 
and that their decisions will be reviewed for abuse of discretion. However since the 
dismissal in this case was really errors of law, the standard should be a correction of error 
standard without deference to any discretion. See State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 and 
Argument 1 below. 
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Plaintiffs Complaint and causes of actions against Defendant's Oldroyd and 
Money were dismissed by the lower court as a discovery sanction pursuant to Rule 
37(b)(2) and (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure [A-l] by Order dated March 17, 
1999[R1607;A-18]. The Order stated; 
'The Court finds that plaintiff's counsel has established a consistent pattern and 
practice of not complying with discovery requests and other dilatory behavior. The 
pattern includes the following; 
(1) On March 27, 1995, the then co-defendant Mountain View Hospital filed its 
first motion to compel, which was subsequently granted by the Court 
(2) On May 8, 1995, the then co-defendant Mountain View Hospital filed its 
second motion to compel, which was subsequently granted by the Court 
(3) On August 7, 1995, the then co-defendant Mountain View Hospital filed a 
motion for default judgment, seeking sanctions for plaintiffs failure to respond to the 
first and second motions to compel 
(4) On August 29, 1995, the Court granted the then co-defendant Mountain View 
Hospital's motion for default judgment and dismissed plaintiff's Complaint for failure to 
comply with discovery requests. 
(5) On April 111995, the defendant filed their first motion to compel, which was 
subsequently granted by the Court 
(6) On July 30, 1998, the defendants filed their second motion to compel, which 
was subsequently granted by the Court 
(7) Also on July 30, 1998, the defendants filed a motion for sanctions, seeking an 
award of attorney 'sfees and costs for plaintiffs failure to comply with discovery 
requests, which was subsequently granted by the Court 
(8) On September 14, 1998, the defendants filed their third motion to compel, 
which was subsequently granted by the Court 
(9) On November 25, 1998, the defendants filed a motion for sanctions, seeking 
dismissal of plaintiff's Complaint for failure to comply with discovery requests, which 
was subsequently granted by the Court 
(10) On December 8, 1998, the defendants filed a notice to submit for decision 
and request for ruling, since the plaintiff did not file a memorandum in opposition. 
The Court finds that the behavior of plaintiff in failing to comply with discovery requests 
was willful The Court further finds that plaintiff has engaged in persistent dilatory 
tactics that have frustrated the judicial process. The sanction of dismissal of plaintiff's 
Complaint is justified based upon the willful behavior and the repeated practice of 
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failure to comply with discovery requests. 
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Defendants' Motion to Strike is denied. 
2. Plaintiffs Application to Submit an Over Length Reply Memorandum to 
Defendant 's Memorandum Objecting to Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Order Dismissing 
Plaintiff's Complaint is granted. 
3. Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees is denied. 
4. Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Order Dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint is 
denied. 
5. Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint is hereby dismissed without prejudice." 
III. Marshaling of the Evidence. 
The following references to the Record are made marshaling evidence supporting 
the Order of the Court dismissing plaintiffs complaint dated March 17,1999 [Record 
page 1607]. 
1. Plaintiffs initial complaint was filed August 2,1993 [R 4; A-14]. 
2. Mt. View Hospital's first Motion to compel was filed March 27,1995 [R 273] 
supported by Memorandum filed on the same day [R 327] 
3. On June 15,1995 the court issued its Order compelling that Mt. View's 
interrogatories be answered and documents produced more fully than plaintiff had done 
in her answers to interrogatories, and to answer Mt. Views second set of interrogatories 
and request for production of documents. [R398]. 
4. Mt. View filed its Motion for Default Judgment due to alleged failures of 
plaintiff to answer interrogatories fully to Mt. View's satisfaction and produce documents 
on August 7,1995. [R 423]. 
5. On August 29,1995 the lower court filed its Ruling striking or dismissing 
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plaintiffs complaint against Mr. View Hospital without prejudice and ordered Mt. View 
to prepare an Order consistent with the Ruling. [R 434] 
6. On October 4,1995 the lower court filed its Order dismissing plaintiffs 
complaint against Mt. View Hospital. [R 446]. 
7. On April 11,1995 Defendants Oldroyd and Money filed their first Motion to 
Compel the signing of informally requested medical records release forms, fourteen in 
number.[A-24 & 25]. The Motion to Compel was dated April 6,1995. [R 329; A-22, and 
see Memorandum in support thereof, also signed on April 6,1995 and filed April 11, 
1995 R357].2 
8. On June 30,1995 Defendants Oldroyd and Money filed their second Motion to 
Compel [A-27] with supporting Memorandum, seeking two or three additional informally 
requested medical records release forms [A-29 & 30]. [R 400 and 419]. 
9. On August 29,1995 the lower court filed its Ruling requiring that the two or 
three consent forms be signed, and ordered defendants' counsel to prepare an Order to 
that effect.3[R 432; A-31]. These forms were timely signed consistent with the Ruling 
2
 No Ruling or Order of the Court was issued pursuant to this Motion to Compel. 
Defendants assertions that there was, is wrong and is not supported in the record. In turn 
the Court's Order finding the same was wrong. Defendants Oldroyd and Money's 
counsel admitted that these informally requested forms were signed and delivered to him 
on April 4,1995, two days before he signed the first Motion to Compel and seven days 
before it was filed. [R 419 -418 paragraph 4 and 5; A-26]. 
3
 No Order was ever prepared by defendants' counsel to this effect. Therefore, as 
argued below there really was no court order compelling the signing of these two or three 
forms as wrongly asserted by the defendants and erroneously found by the Court in the 
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and returned to defendants' counsel by plaintiff.[R 438; A-33]. 
10. On July 30, 1998 Defendants Oldroyd and Money filed their third Motion to 
Compel seeking production of the so-called "altered documents" and their supporting 
Memorandum. [R 985; A-35]. 
11. On July 30, 1998 the defendants also filed a Motion for Attorney's fees 
concerning the filing of the Motion to Compel seeking production of the so-called 
"altered documents". [R 983] 
12. On August 26,1998, several motions of both parties were before the Court for 
hearing and the Court filed an Order pursuant to the hearing on September 14,1998, 
which among other orders, the Court granted defendants' July 30 Motion to Compel and 
ordered 'Within thirty (30) days from August 26, 1998, plaintiff will produce all 
documents which she contends have been altered in any manner by defendants, 
defendants' counsel, or any agent or employee of defendants' insurance carrier. 
Plaintiff will submit to a deposition to take place on or before November 13, 1998. "[R 
1367; A-57]. 
The Court also granted defendants' Motion for attorney's fees and cost which were 
set at $232.10. [R 1369] 
13. The fourth motion to compel was filed September 14,1998 [R 1344; A-62]. It 
Order dismissing plaintiffs complaint. And they were timely signed anyway pursuant to 
the Ruling. 
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again was seeking an order of the Court requiring the plaintiff to sign informally 
requested medical records release forms. [A-64 & 65]. No court order was ever entered 
concerning this Motion to Compel or Objection.4 
14. Defendants filed a Subpoena Duce Tecum on attorney W. Andrew 
McCullough to take his deposition and to produce "all files, documents and other records 
which in any way record or refer to any meetings, consultations, or conversations with 
Marilyn R. Hales" [R 1411]. 
15. Plaintiffs attorney invoked her attorney/client privilege in a letter to Mr. 
McCullough because neither she nor her attorney could attended the deposition. [R 1432 
and 1441] 
IV. Statement of Facts, 
The file in this case is voluminous, more than 1,670 pages are contained in the 
Record. Three different District Court Judges have considered this case, Judge 
Burningham, Judge Schofield, and finally Judge Harding Jr., pursuant to the Fourth 
District's rotation schedule. 
4The Plaintiff filed an Objection to this Motion to Compel on September 23, 1998 
.[Record page 1376]. Neither the Objection nor the Motion to Compel was ever 
considered by the court. However plaintiff signed the requested release forms after they 
were submitted to her anyway, and the defendants utilized them to obtain the medical 
records they wanted. [Record page 1645 through 1639]. As in other footnotes above, no 
court order was ever entered concerning this motion to compel either, and the defendants' 
assertion that there was is wrong, and in turn the Court's Order to that effect was also in 
error and not supported by the Record. 
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Plaintiff filed her original complaint for medical malpractice against Dr. Oldroyd 
and Dr. Money, and also against Mt. View Hospital, in August 1993. [R 4; A-14] The 
complaint against Drs. Oldroyd and Money concerns two operations they performed on 
plaintiff's digestive tract in April of 1987. The first of the two operations, according to 
defendants' operative reports, was to explore for a possible small intestine blockage. But, 
according to plaintiffs expert's opinion the first operation was not necessary or even
 :> 
called for in the first place and next was incorrectly performed anyway for the type of 
surgery it was. The second surgery was to correct failures which occurred in the first 
surgery. During the second surgery sixty-percent or more of plaintiff's stomach was 
removed and other manipulations of plaintiff's digestive tract were performed by the 
defendants, again unnecessarily according to plaintiff's expert's testimony, leaving 
plaintiffs digestive tract basically non-functioning. [R 747-12 & 761]5 Since that time the 
plaintiff has basically lived in hospitals all over the western United States, for purposes of 
preventing her demise as a result of the faulty operations performed by the defendants. [R. 
225,438,686,&1345;A-33] 
Defendants Oldroyd and Money filed several Motions to Dismiss. The first filed 
December 3,1993 [R 17 & 22]; the second filed March 29,1994 [R 135]. All of 
defendants' said motions were denied by the lower court.[R 236]. Finally on December 
Plaintiff's memorandum was misnamed, and should have been entitled 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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4, 1997, about four and one-half years after plaintiffs complaint, defendants Oldroyd and 
Money filed their first Answer in the case.[R 862]. They filed their Answer to the Second 
Amended Complaint on October 9,1998, [R. 1426]. 
In spite of the fact that an answer was never filed by defendants, the case was set 
for trial three times by the lower court. Two of those settings were continued by the 
defendants. [R 896 & 1036]. 
During the course of the above motion practice and proceedings concerning 
motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment, defendants Oldroyd and Money 
also filed their first motion to compel the signing of fourteen informally requested medical 
records release forms, filed April 11,1995 [R. 329, 357; A-22]. This was done in spite 
of the fact that the plaintiff had already signed them and after the defendants' attorneys 
had received them.. Defendants's attorneys acknowledged that the original fourteen 
consent forms were signed by plaintiff and returned to them on or about April 4,1995. 
They acknowledged the prior signing and return in their Memorandum in support of their 
second motion to compel the signing of additional informally requested release forms. [R. 
418; paragraph 4 and 5; A-26]. No court order was made requiring the plaintiff to sign 
the first set of informally requested medical records release forms. The court's order 
filed June 15,1995 concerned Mt. View Hospital's interrogatories and demands for 
production of documents and had nothing to do with Defendants Oldroyd and Money's 
first set of informally requested release forms. [R. 327 and 388, and Order of the Court 
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filed June 15,1995 R. 398] . 
Defendants Oldroyd and Money's second Motion to Compel the signing of 
informally requested release forms was filed June 30,1995. [R. 400,403 & 407; A.-27, 
29, & 30]. The Court Ruled, on August 29,1995, that they should be signed, and 
required the defendants to prepare an Order to that effect which was never done, [R. 432; 
A-31]. Plaintiff timely signed and returned the second set of informally requested release 
forms and thus fully complied with the Ruling. [R. 438; A-33]. 
On July 1,1998 the plaintiff attended her first scheduled deposition, scheduled by 
Defendant's Oldroyd and Money. The third motion to compel was filed on July 30,1998 
[R 985; A-35]. It grew out of the taking of Plaintiff s deposition on July 1,1998 which 
was aborted by Curtis Drake, attorney for defendants, when plaintiff told him she thought 
he or the insurance company had altered some of her medical records.[R. 1012; A.-37]. 
That motion to compel resulted in an Order of the Court dated September 14,1998 [R. 
1367; A-57] where the Court said "Defendant's Motion to Compel is granted; Within 30 
days from August 26, 1998, plaintiff-will produce all documents which she contends 
have been altered...." (Emphasis added). " Plaintiff will submit to a deposition to take 
place on or before November 13, 1998. [R. 1366 last paragraph; A.-5 8]. Other than the 
claimed altered documents she produced at her deposition of July 1,1998, [R. 991 - 986;] 
plaintiff found no other documents which she contended were altered and therefore 
produced no other documents in response to the court's order.[R. 1667 paragraph 9]. 
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Defendants never rescheduled her deposition on or before November 13,1998. 
The fourth motion to compel was filed September 14, 1998 [R. 1344; A-62]. It 
again was for an order of the Court requiring the plaintiff to sign informally requested 
medical records release forms. [A-64 & 65]. The Plaintiff filed an Objection to this 
Motion to Compel on September 23,1998 because it falsely accused her of not signing 
release forms which had never been submitted to her.[R. 1376; and see letter A-66]. 
However she signed the requested release forms after they were submitted to her anyway, 
and the defendants utilized them to obtain the medical records they wanted. [R. 1645 
through 1639; A-67,68,69,70,71 & 72]. No court order was ever entered concerning 
this Motion to Compel or the Objection thereto. 
The defendants' motion to dismiss as a discovery sanction was also based on an 
order of the lower court dismissing plaintiffs cause of action against Mr. View Hospital, 
October 10,1995.[R 446]. Mt. View had been named as a defendant early on in the case 
on a theory of vicarious liability because the doctors had performed the questioned 
operations there. [R 4; A-14]. 
The defendants' motion to dismiss as a discovery sanction was also was based on a 
claim that the plaintiff violated the discovery rules because she invoked her 
attorney/client privilege when defendants noticed up the taking of attorney Andy 
McCullough's deposition, and subpoenaed his files concerning is consultations with the 
plaintiff.[R. 1372 and 1452] 
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The lower court entered an order dismissing plaintiffs Second Amended 
Complaint as a sanction by Order dated March 17th, 1999 which is the Order appealed 
from in this case. [R 1607; A-18] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
• • ' , ' . • / / • • . : . v W 
Argument 1: ^ 
Before a trial court may dismiss a parties complaint or cause of action against -., 
another party as a sanction under Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
without there being a violation of a court order compelling discovery, there must have 
first been an altogether or complete failure to respond to a moving parties' demands for 
production of documents under Rule 34. In this case the plaintiffs complaint and cause 
of action was dismissed as a discovery sanction, but she did not altogether or completely 
fail to respond to defendants' demands for production of documents under Rule 34. In 
fact she completely responded to all of defendant Oldroyd and Money's discovery request 
and fully complied with any order or ruling that was issued by the court. 
Argument II: 
It is clear from reading the Rules of Discovery in the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and particularly the provisions of Rule 34, that the discovery requirements to 
produce documents only covers the production of evidence, or medical records in this 
case, that are in the possession, custody or control of the plaintiff. From the very nature 
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of the informal request, that she sign medical release forms for different doctors and 
hospitals, it goes without saying that the records the defendants were seeking were in the 
possession, custody or control of third parties i.e. doctors and hospitals, not the plaintiff 
Therefore the informally request that she sign medical records release forms is not 
covered under Rule 34 or enforceable under Rule 37(d) or any other rule of discovery and 
the lower court erred in dismissing plaintiffs complaint as a discovery sanction relating 
to the informally requested medical records release forms. 
Argument III: 
Defendants' requests that plaintiff sign medical release forms, were informal 
requests submitted to plaintiffs counsel via personal letters signed by a paralegal to 
defendants' attorneys. Since the request were not submitted formally under the Rules of 
Civil Procedure, they were submitted outside the rules and the defendants are not entitled 
to claim the sanctions provided for in the rules. 
Argument IV, 
The dismissal of plaintiff s cause of action against Mt. View Hospital early in the 
case as a discovery sanction had nothing to do with defendants Oldroyd and Money, and 
that early dismissal in favor of Mt. View did not justify the lower court's dismissal of 
plaintiff s complaint against Oldroyd and Money. 
Argument V, 
The plaintiff was entitled to claim her attorney/client privilege when the 
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defendants noticed up to taking of a former attorney's deposition. No waiver or 
exceptions of the privilege is provided for in case law, rules, or by statute, and the lower 
court's dismissal of her complaint as a discovery sanction because she did was error. 
Argument VI. The plaintiff did not delay the proceedings in this case, but rather 
the defendants did with their unfounded motion practice in the case, their failure to file an 
Answer for about four and one-half years, their disruption of plaintiff s attempt to take the 
deposition of a key witness and other acts of delay. Plaintiff cooperated in discovery in 
many ways and responded the best she could under the serious life and death condition 
the defendants left her in after their negligent and uncalled for operations. 
Argument VII. 
The lower court's dismissal of plaintiff s complaint and cause of action against the 
defendants Oldroyd and Money violated the plaintiffs right to her day in court to redress 
the injuries caused her by defendants' negligently performed and uncalled for operations. 
ARGUMENTS 
Argument I 
Before a trial court may dismiss a parties complaint or cause of action against 
another party as a sanction under Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure without 
there being a violation of a court order compelling discovery, there must have first been 
an altogether or complete failure to respond to a moving parties' demands for production 
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of documents under Rule 34. In this case the plaintiffs complaint and cause of action 
was dismissed as a discovery sanction, but she did not fail to respond to defendants 
demands for production of documents under Rule 34 and did not violate any court order. 
In fact she did fully respond to all of defendants' discovery request and complied with any 
discovery orders made by the court. 
The Utah version of Rule 37 [A-l] is nearly identical to the Federal Rule 37, for all 
intents and purposes. It may be that under the Federal Rule and cases found thereunder, 
sanctions under Rule 37(d) [A-3] do not always require a violation of a court order.6 
However, even if the Utah Rules follow the federal rule on this question, under the 
Federal Rule there must be an altogether and complete failure to respond to a Rule 34 
demand for production of documents before the court is empowered to impose a sanction 
of dismissal, or any sanction, without a violation of a court order. Or put another way, if a 
party has responded either fully or partially, the court can not dismiss the parties 
complaint as a sanction unless there has been a court order of discovery entered, and the 
order violated by the party. This is made clear in Federal Civil Rules Handbook 1999 
Edition. Baicker-Mckee, Janssen, and Corr, West Group, page 536 where it is stated that; 
"Rule 3 7(d) only applies if the party fails altogether to serve a response to 
interrogatories or document requests. If the party serves an incomplete or evasive 
response, the proper procedure is a motion to compel under Rule 37(a), then a motion 
for sanctions under Rule 37(b) if the party does not comply with the court order." Citing 
6However there has been no direct holding on this issue, under the Utah version of 
the Rule. 
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Fjelstad v.American Honda Motor Co., Inc. 762 K2d 1334, 9th dr. 1985. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 37, in pertinent part, provides as follows; 
"(a) Motion for Order Compelling Discovery. A party, upon reasonable notice to 
other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling 
discovery as follows:.... 
(2) Motion if a party, in response to a request for inspection submitted under 
Rule 34, fails to respond.... the discovering party may move for an order compelling... 
inspection in accordance with the request.... 
(b) Failure to Comply With Order.... 
(2) Sanctions by Court in Which Action Is Pending. If a party.. .fails to obey an 
order to provide or permit discovery,... the court in which the action is pending may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others the following:... 
(C) an order... dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or 
rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party;.... 
(d) Failure of Party to... Respond to Request for Inspection. If a party... fails 
(3) to serve a written response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, 
after proper service of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion 
may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may take 
any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision (b)(2) of this 
rule " 
Subdivision (b) where it says "Failure to Comply with Order" makes it clear that 
an Order of the Court compelling a discovery step and a violation of that order is a 
condition precedent to the imposition of the any sanction provided for under (b). This 
obvious requirement is fortified by subdivision (2) above where it says, if a party fails to 
obey an order to provide or permit discovery the court may dismiss the action. 
This requirement is again fortified by the holding in 938 P.2d 271, Morton v. 
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Continental Baking Co.. (Utah 1997). Morton is the case that the defendants in this sub 
judice case primarily based their Motion to Dismiss on, as a sanction, in the lower court. 
Morton is a case where the Supreme Court of Utah did uphold the dismissal of Morton's 
case as a discovery sanction but it is not authority for defendants' dismissal as a sanction 
in this case. It is clear from reading the Morton case that the lower court's order 
compelling discovery which Morton violated, was a prerequisite to the approved 
dismissal of his case as a sanction. The Supreme Court in Morton said; 
"Morton did not provide the discovery responses by March 10, and on March 
18, 1994, Continental filed a motion to compel, a copy of which was served on Morton. 
In the motion, Continental requested that the trial court order Morton to respond within 
ten days or face dismissal of his case. Morton failed to respond to this motion. 
On March 31, 1994, Continental filed a notice to submit for decision its motion 
to compel, a copy of which was sent to Morton. Morton did not respond. The court, on 
April 12, 1994, directed Continental to prepare an order requiring Morton to respond to 
ContinentaVs discovery requests within ten days or face "the dismissal of all of Plaintiffs 
claims for relief11 In the order the court made it clear that Morton had "until 5:00 
o'clock p.m. on the tenth day" from the signing of the order to comply. (FNl) This order 
was mailed to Morton on April 12. 
Morton did not respond in any way to either the notice to submit or the court's 
order. The discovery responses were not received by the Friday, April 22, deadline. On 
Monday, April 25, 1996, Continental prepared a proposed order to dismiss pursuant to 
the April 12 order a copy of which was hand-delivered to Morton. On that same day, 
Morton responded for the first time to the discovery requests by faxing responses to 
Continental. The court signed the order to dismiss on April 28, 1994. " 
In this sub judice case defendants filed four motions to compel. The first 
concerned fourteen informally requested medical records release forms, but no motion to 
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compel was filed and no court order was filed concerning this first request.7 
Defendants Oldroyd and Money's second Motion to Compel the signing of 
informally requested release forms [R 403 & 407; A-29 & 30] was filed June 30,1995. 
[R. 400; A-27]. The court ruled that they should be signed, and required the defendants 
to prepare an Order to that effect which was never done, on August 29,1995 [R. 432; A-
31]8. Even if the Ruling is considered an order of the court, the plaintiff timely complied 
with the Ruling by return letter enclosing the requested release forms and advising the 
court.[R.438;A-33] 
The third motion to compel which was filed on July 28,1998 [R 985; A-35]. It 
grew out of the taking of Plaintiffs deposition on July 1,1998 which was aborted by 
Curtis Drake, attorney for defendants, when plaintiff told him she thought he or the 
insurance company might have altered some of her medical records.[R 1012; A-37]. That 
motion to compel resulted in an Order of the Court dated September 14,1998 [R 1367; 
A-57] where the Court said "Defendant's Motion to Compel is granted; Within 30 days 
from August 26, 1998, plaintiff will produce all documents which she contends have 
been altered...." (Emphasis added). " Plaintiff will submit to a deposition to take place 
7The defendants' recitation in their Memorandum in Support of their Motion to 
Dismiss as a sanction,[R 1452], and in turn the lower courts Ruling, [R 1458] and Order 
[R 1607] are wrong according to what is reflected in the Record. 
8Since the court required the defendants attorney to prepare an order to put the 
Ruling in effect, and since the defendants did not do so, the plaintiff argues that there was 
no court order requiring her to sign the two or three release forms covered in the second 
motion to compel. 
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on or before November 13,1998. [R 1366 last paragraph; A-58]. Other than the claimed 
altered documents she produced at her deposition of July 1,1998, [R page 991 - 986] 
plaintiff found no other documents which she contended were altered and therefore 
produced no other documents in response to the court's order.[R 1667 paragraph 9]. 
Defendants never rescheduled her deposition on or before November 13,1998. The 
question is, did the plaintiff violate an order of the court compelling discovery? She did 
not. The language of the order, that she produce documents "which she contends have 
been altered" leaves the production up to her, and whether or not she found any and 
wanted to claim that they had been altered by Curtis Drake or the insurance company. If 
she did, she was to produce them by the deadline to be used during her rescheduled 
deposition on or before November 13,1998. If she did not find any she wanted to 
contend had been altered she was not required to produce anything. The court order of 
September 14,1998 was open ended, and her failure to produce additional documents 
over and above what she had already produced on July 1,1998 did not violate the Court's 
order. The order only required her to produce them if she found others. 
This is particularly true where the defendant's never rescheduled her deposition 
on or before November 13,1998. Instead they filed a Motion to Dismiss, as a sanction 
for failure to produce additional documents. If they had rescheduled, and if the plaintiff 
would have then produced other documents after the deadline of September 26,1998 
then she may have been in violation of the Court's order, but that never happened. Even 
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if that had happened, the remedy would have been to bar her from claiming anything for 
the documents produced to late, not dismissal of her case. [Rule 37; A-l] 
The fourth motion to compel was filed September 14,1998 [R. 1344; A-62]. It 
again was for an order of the Court requiring the plaintiff to sign informally requested 
medical records release forms.[R. 1353 & 1352; A-64 & 65]. The Plaintiff filed an 
Objection to this Motion to Compel on September 23,1998 because it falsely accused her 
of not signing release forms which had never been submitted to her.[R. 1376; and see 
letter A-66]. However she signed the requested release forms after they were submitted 
to her anyway, and the defendants utilized them to obtain the medical records they 
wanted.[R. 1645 through 1639; A-67,68,69,70,71, & 72]. No court order was ever 
entered concerning this Motion to Compel or Objection.9 
Since plaintiff has demonstrated from the Record that she did not completely fail 
to respond to defendants Rule 34 request, but rather fully complied, and did not violate 
any court order compelling discover, or did in fact comply with the orders, it was error for 
the lower court to dismiss her complaint against Dr. Oldroyd and Money as a discovery 
sanction. The lower court's order of dismissal should be reversed and the lower court 
ordered to proceed with discovery and conclusion of the case consistent with its Order of 
September 14,1998.[R 1367; A-57]. 
Argument II. 
9Again, the defendants' assertion and the court's order that there was are wrong and not 
supported by the Record. 
Page21of36 
Defendants' Motion to dismiss as a sanction seems to rely on the provisions of 
Rule 34 to support their position. 
Rule 34 [A-5] of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that; 
"(a) Scope. Any party may serve on any other party a request 
(I) to produce and permit the party making the request, or someone acting on 
his behalf, to inspect and copy, any designated documents (including writings, drawings, 
graphs, charts, photographs, phono-records, and other data compilations from which 
information can be obtained,. ..orto inspect and copy, test, or sample any tangible 
things which constitute or contain matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) and which are 
in the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is served:... 
It is clear from reading these provisions of Rule 34, that the discovery 
requirement to produce documents only covers the production of documents, medical 
records in this case, that are in the possession, custody or control of the plaintiff. From 
the very nature of the informal request, that she sign medical release forms for procuring 
medical records from different doctors and hospitals, it goes without saying that the 
records the defendants were seeking were in the possession, custody or control of third 
parties, not the plaintiff. Therefore the informally request that she sign medical records 
release forms is not covered or enforceable under Rule 34 or any other rule of discovery. 
Neither can it be argued that medical records in a medical malpractice case are in 
the exclusive control of a patient because of the physician/patient privilege. In medical 
malpractice cases such records are not protected by the physician/patient privilege. Utah 
Code § 78-24-8 [ A-10] in pertinent part provides that; 
'There are particular relations in which it is the policy of the law to encourage 
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confidence and to preserve it inviolate. Therefore, a person cannot be examined as a 
witness in the following cases:.... 
(4) A physician or surgeon cannot, without the consent of his patient, be 
examined in a civil action as to any information acquired in attending the patient which 
was necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the patient However, this privilege 
shall be deemed to be waived by the patient in an action in which the patient places his 
medical condition at issue as an element or factor of his claim or defense. Under those 
circumstances, a physician or surgeon who has prescribed for or treated that patient for 
the medical condition at issue may provide information, interviews, reports, records, 
statements, memoranda, or other data relating to the patients medical condition and% 
treatment which are placed at issue...." 
A defendant in a medical malpractice case is free to go directly to the plaintiffs 
health care providers to obtain the medical records' of the plaintiff which are in the 
provider's possession, custody and control. No release forms are needed. This was 
obviously well known to defendants attorneys' herein because most of plaintiff's medical 
records were obtained by them via the subpoena duces tecum process. [See footnote 3]. In 
fact Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure recognizes that documents in the 
possession of other third parties, not parties to the action are outside the rules. Paragraph 
(c) of the rule says; 
"(c) Persons Not Parties. This rule does not preclude an independent action 
against a person not a party for production of documents and things and permission to 
enter upon land." 
The discovery rules and particularly Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
does not require the plaintiff in this case to sign informally requested medical records 
release forms, or suffer a sanction of dismissal in connection thereto, and the signing of 
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these ton :t is by plaii itiff is i lot i lecessai ) r for defendai its to get ai i> i i ledical records of hers 
they want from her health care providers. This is to say nothing o f the fact that she signed 
them all anyway as set out above. Certainly the lower court erred when it dismissed 
plaint i f fs complaint and causes o f action because the defendants ask her to sign them and 
tl len filed motioi is to compel t! le sigi lii ig of tl lem I he Orde r appealed from should be 
reversed by this Court and the lower Court ordered to proceed with discovery as ordered 
in the September 14, 1998 order and conclude this case according to law. 
Argument III. 
\s has been pointed 01 it tl n 01 ighoi it tl lis Bi ief, the defendants' reqi test ill lat 
plaintiff sign medical release forms, were informal request submitted to plaintiffs counsel 
via personal letters. Since the request were not submitted formally under the Rules of 
Civil Procedure, they were submitted outside the rules and the defendants are not entitled 
to claim the sanctions pi o\ ided foi t it iciei tl le i ules. 
Rule 37(d) [A-3] requires a proper formal service of the request. It says, 
". . . If a party.. .fails. . . (3) to serve a written response to a request for inspection 
submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of the request the court in which the 
action is pending on motion may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, 
and amoung others it may take any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B)9 and (c) 
of Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. "(Emphasis added). 
Rule 84 o f the Utah Rules o f Civil Procedure [A-9] provides that; 
"The forms contained in the Appendix of Forms are sufficient under the rules and 
are intended to indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules 
contemplate." 
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Form 1 of the "forms" in the appendix of the Rules shows the caption to be used 
in all formal pleadings filed under the rules of procedure. Defendants' request were 
submitted via personal letters and did not conform with these formal pleading 
requirements. In addition, Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that all 
pleadings will be sign by an attorney for the party filing the pleading or by the party. In 
regards to the informally requested medical records release forms, the letters sent to 
plaintiffs attorney to that effect were not signed by defendants attorney nor were they 
signed by the defendants themselves. Rather they were signed by a paralegal person for 
the law firm.[A-24,29 & 64]. Certainly the informal request can not be considered 
formal discovery request under the rules. 
In addition to the formal pleading requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 4-502 of the Rules of Judicial Administration, [A-7] provides as follows; 
"(1) Parties conducting discovery under Rules 33, 34 and 36 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure shall not file discovery requests with the clerk of the court, but shall file 
only the original certificate of service stating that the discovery requests have been 
served on the other parties and the date of service. The responding party shall file a 
similar certificate with the clerk of the court. 
(2) The party serving the discovery request shall retain the original with a copy of 
the proof of service affixed to it and serve a copy of the discovery request and proof of 
service upon the opposing party or counsel The party responding to the discovery 
request shall retain the original with a copy of the proof of service affixed to it, and serve 
a copy of the responses and the proof of service upon the opposing party or counsel The 
discovery requests and response shall not be filed with the clerk of the court unless the 
court on motion and notice and for good cause shown so orders. 
(3) Any party filing a motion to compel compliance with a discovery request or a 
motion which relies upon the discovery response shall attach a copy of the discovery 
Page 25 of 36 
request or response which is at issue in the motion. . . . 
(5) All parties shall be entitled to conduct discovery proceedings in accordance with 
this rule. 
It is respectfully submitted that the defendants did 11<»! f<)11<)\\ Rule 4-502 in any sense 
of the word. They did ilot serve a formal demand on the plaintiffs counsel, and they did 
not file a formal Certificate of Service of the request for release forms with the Clerk of 
the Court. Neither did they attach copies of a formal demand or of a certificate of service 
to their Motions to Compel. Defendants' utter failures to follow 1 1 le Rules of discovery in 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Judicial Administration, bars them 
from seeking the sanctions they did under the Rules, and bars the lower court from 
dismissing as a sanction the plaintiff's complaint. The lower court's order of dismissal 
should be reversed foi this reason also, ai id ordered to pi oceed vv itl i discovery consistent 
with its Order of September 14,1998 and conclusion of this case according to law. 
Argument IV, 
When the plaintiff first filed her case, she named the hospital where Dr.'s Oldroyd 
and Money perfoi i iieci the tvv o operations in question, ]\ It. \ iew I lospital N It. View's 
attorneys filed discovery request consistent with the rules, and ultimately filed a motion to 
dismiss as a sanction, which the lower court granted. Plaintiffs complaint was dismissed 
as against Mt. View Hospital, but not against Dr.'s Oldroyd and Money. The dismissal of 
plan itiif's complaii it had i lotl lii lg to do w itl I these lattei defendai its ai id they contini ied 
their defense, filing there own discovery request, and filing their own Motions to Dismiss 
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and Motions for Summary Judgment. 
Some three years later, when the Defendants Oldroyd and Money filed the questioned 
Motion to Dismiss as a sanction for discovery violations against the plaintiff, they cited 
the fact that plaintiffs case against Mt. View had been earlier dismissed as a discovery 
sanction. The lower court based its order dismissing plaintiffs complaint against 
Defendant Oldroyd and Money on the fact that it had earlier dismissed her case against 
Mt. View as a discovery sanction. This error is patently wrong, as the plaintiff had 
already suffered a sanction for what ever court ordered discovery violation she had 
committed and to punish her again by dismissing her complaint against Defendants 
Oldroyd and Money cannot be upheld. This is especially true where plaintiffs cause of 
action against Mt. View had nothing to do with Defendants Oldroyd and Money. 
Plaintiffs cause of action against Mt. View was based on a vicarious liability theory 
which Mt. View vigorously opposed. The plaintiff was attempting to state a cause of 
action against Mt. View solely on the premise that the operations performed by Drs. 
Oldroyd and Money were performed there. No allegation was made against Defendants 
Oldroyd and Money based on the premise that they were liable for some wrong that Mt. 
View had committed during the operations. [A-14]. Plaintiff was not able to sustain her 
cause of action against Mt. View, and chose to allow it to be dismissed by the court. But 
that dismissal did not have anything to do with Defendants Oldroyd and Money and their 
claim that the causes of action against them should be dismissed because of it cannot be 
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sustained. 
Argument V, 
The final bases for the dismissal advocated by the defendants was because when the 
McCuUough, [R 1411], the plaintiffs attorney advised Mr. McCuUough that she invoked 
her attorney/client privilege and did not want him to answer any questions about her 
consultations with him, primarily because neither the plaintiff nor her attorney could 
attend (lit1 scheduled deposilion \\< 14 \?\ Hiid Ihey been iihle In he there, fhe insinuation 
is that plaintiff would have allowed the deposition and examination of attorney 
McCullough's files as she did when the defendants did the same with attorney Chuntz. 
Defendants5 claim, that the plaintiffs invoking of her privilege violated the Rules of 
sanction. [R 1 4 5 2 , 1 4 4 6 ] . The defendants never filed a Motion to Compel the allowance 
o f the deposition o f Mr. McCuUough and there never was a hearing concerning this issue. 
N o order of the court was obtained ordering the plaintiff to allow the deposition in spite 
o f the privilege In si 101 1: the lo vi ei ecu ii 11 ie\ ei considered this issi ic Defendants did i ise 
the invoking o f the privilege to support their motion to dismiss as a sanction and the lower 
court apparently used it as a reason to dismiss plaintiffs complaint as a sanction. [R 
1.458] when it said "plaintiff "is counsel has established a consistent pattern and practice 
of not complying with discovery requests and other dilatory behavior" Appai en: itl) this 
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statement refers to the letter that plaintiffs counsel wrote to Mr. McCullough advising 
him that plaintiff invoked her attorney/client privilege when defendants noticed up his 
deposition.[R 1432]. 
This error on the part of the lower court in dismissing plaintiff's cause of action as a 
discovery sanction because plaintiff invoked her attorney/client privilege is especially ~ '• 
heinous where there is no Utah case law or statutory authority that says a party waives her 
attorney/client privilege in a medical malpractice case.[R 1452]. Neither Utah Code v 
Annotated Section 78-24-8 nor Utah Rule of Evidence Rule 504 provides for a waiver of 
the attorney/client privilege as asserted by defendants and executed by the lower court. 
This is in contrast with the Physician/patient privilege in Section 78-24-8 [A-10] where 
an exception or waiver is provided for in medical malpractice cases. 
Argument VI -u 
The defendants cite delay in their memorandums in support of their motion to dismiss 
as a sanction, and point out the several years that the case has been pending since it was 
filed in August of 1993. The delay in prosecuting the case is on the backs of the 
defendants, not the plaintiff because of her alleged discovery violations as set out and 
argued above. 
A review of the Record shows that; 
Drs. Oldroyd and Money first filed Motions to Dismiss on the bases that the plaintiff 
did not plead and avoid the affirmative defense of the case being filed beyond the statute 
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of limitations. In fact the defendants filed two such motions to dismiss. The first on 
December 3, 1993 [R. 17 and 22] which was opposed by the plaintiff. [R. 66 ]. The 
second motion to dismiss was filed on March 29, 1994,,,, [R 135]. rhe second motion was 
opposed b> tl le plaintiff on the: basis ti mt it le plaintiff was i lot i eqi in eel b> t! le i n lies of 
pleading to plead avoidance of the affirmative defense of the running of a statute of 
limitation, and that the defendants could not raise the defense in a motion to dismiss, but 
rather were required to plead it as an affirmative defense in an Answer. [R 192 Notice 
to si ibmit for decision was filed A pril 18, 1994. rhe coi n t's decision oven uling ai id 
denying the defendants' motions to dismiss was filed June 13,1994 [R. 236] consuming 
nearly one year of time. It is obvious from the courts Ruling that the defendants were 
wrong in raising the statute of limitation defense in a motion to dismiss rather than as an 
affirmative defei lse ii it tl leii ^\ i lswei 1 1 ie> 'did i lot i aise the defense i mtil they filed their 
first Answer December 3,1997 [R. 862] nearly four and one-half years later. The 
defendants next tried a series of motions for summary judgment, the first was filed March 
5 w " fhat motion for summary judgment was denied b>the court 
on June ' ? 19V - •• j
 ( n der filed November 21, 1997 [R 855],,,, I he defendants 
filed another motion for summary judgment again on June 24, 1997 [R. 828]. On July 9, 
1998 the defendant Money again filed a motion for summary judgment which was almost 
this last motion for summary judgment on the basis that it was repetitive of the earlier 
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motion for summary judgment. 
In addition to the repetitive motions, the defendants' attorney frustrated 
plaintiffs early attempt to take the deposition of a possible key witness in the case, Dr. 
Richard Thomas. The plaintiff had noticed up the taking of the Doctor's deposition, and 
Curtis Drake attended on behalf of his clients. Curtis Drake deliberately interfered with 
the deposition, and absolutely refused to allow the plaintiff to continue the deposition and 
even blocked the witness from answering the questions. Plaintiff was required to obtain a 
protective order of the court to prevent defendants' attorney from using the tactic to ^v 
further frustrate the plaintiffs case.[ R. 449,461 and resulting order 498 and 520] 
It is clear from reading the record that the delays in this case were primarily 
caused by the motion and tactics of the defendants, and not the result of any so called 
discovery violations which the defendants point to in their motion for sanctions. In fact 
the defendants do not claim or show that the passing of time in this case resulted from the 
actions of the plaintiff in discovery matters. 
Further, it is clear from reading the deposition of the plaintiff where she thought 
Curtis Drake had altered some of her medical records, that the problem was not the 
impact it might have on his clients case, but rather the impact it had on him personally. [R 
1012 -993; A-37-56] Even though plaintiffs attorney tried to get him to proceed with the 
deposition of the plaintiff, Curtis Drake refused because of his concern for his personal 
reputation and stalled the progress of the case even further. [R. 1012 - 993 and see R. 
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1018]. 
On the other hand the plaintiff did her best to see that the case could move along 
when ever she could. Besides responding to the numerous motions to dismiss and 
motions for ; dgments filed by all defendants, t! ie plaintiff answered 
defendants' interrogatories [R. 352] she signed all release forms submitted to her as 
argued above, she attended her first scheduled deposition in a timely manner which was 
aborted by the defendants' attorney, she stipulated to defendants motion for a psychiatric 
examination evei i thoi igh the defendai its i levei pursued tl ie n lotioi 1 [R 1364 paragi apl i. 7, 
A-57], she stipulated to defendants' motion to not mention other lawsuits against the 
defendants [R. 1365 paragraph 4; A-57], she stipulated to defendants motion to bar 
mentioning insurance at the trial [R. 1365 paragraph 3; A-57], and last but not least she 
Timpanogos Community Mental Health to provide copies of her mental health records to 
the defendants after Wasatch apparently refused to provide them pursuant to the subpoena 
duces tecum process the defendants regularly used | A :> 7) This is particularly important 
in face of the allegatioi i tl lat tl ie plaintiff was atten lptii lg to hit iciei the progress of 
defendants' discovery of her medical records. She was not, as demonstrated by her 
cooperation in defendants quest to get Wasatch's and Timpanogos' records.[R. 1407 and 
1364 paragraph % A ^ i j [see in general the courts order of September 14 1998 R 1367; 
A-57]. 
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In addition to being as cooperative as possible with defendants' discovery quest, 
through out these proceedings, plaintiff has attempted to explain to the defendants' 
attorneys and the court that she spends a great deal of time in emergency hospital stays, 
usually out of state, in an effort to stay alive following the surgeries performed by the 
defendants in this case and has not been able to respond as a healthy and active person 
might be expected to respond in discovery matters. Sometimes she has not been 
physically able to perform at all during the course of the proceedings. [See plaintiffs . 
motion for enlargement of time in which to respond to defendants' discovery request filed 
August 29,1994 R. 255; R686 and plaintiff's letter to defendants' attorneys filed 
September 12,1995 R. 438; A-33; and see plaintiffs letter to defendants' attorneys 
received by them August 27,1998 R. 1345]. 
In comparing the causes of delay in this case attributable to the respective parties, 
it is clear that the bulk of any delays in this case were caused by the unfounded motion 
practice persisted in by the defendants. It resulted from their failure to file an answer 
until nearly four and on-half years had passed. The long running of this case cannot be 
attributed to the plaintiff as the lower court did, and the Utah Court of Appeals should 
reverse the lower court's dismissal for that reason and direct the lower court to proceed 
with its order of September 14,1998 and conclude this case according to law. 
Argument VII. 
The Constitution of the United States, Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1. declares 
that;".. .No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
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immunities oj citizens oj the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person ojlife, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." [A-12] 
The Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Section 11 [A-13] declares that; "All 
courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, shall 
have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary dely; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before 
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party" 
Justice Daniel Stewart of the Utah Supreme Court has aptly warned that there are 
serious constitutional concerns about the imposition of the sanction of dismissal of a 
parties case under the rules of discovery. In Morton, cited above, in his dissenting 
opinion, he said : ' • ' •' • ' •"• ' :-'- - • • ••- . ' .-• • 
"Indeed, constitutional due process rights may be violated if a court refuses to hear 
the merits of the case where there has been a relatively trivial infraction of procedural 
rules Thus, [dismissal is generally imposed only for egregious misconduct, such as 
repeated failure to appear for deposition , Dismissal is "the most extreme sanction 
provided for in the rule, and the Supreme Court has emphasized the necessity for 
cautious use of the rule.... [I]t should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances 
The overriding purpose of modern rules of procedure is to assure that disputes are 
decided on the merits whenever possible. Appellate courts have repeatedly stressed that 
trial courts should seek to impose penalties less severe than the dismissal that Rule 37 
makes available.... 
Indeed, the general rule is that extreme sanctions "should be employed only if the 
district court has determined that it could not fashion an 'equally effective but less 
drastic remedy.... Thus, [tjhe district court abuses its discretion if it imposes a sanction 
of dismissal without first considering the impact of the sanction and the adequacy of less 
drastic sanctions " (citations an inter quotation marks have been omitted) 
Without repeating each argument above it is respectfully submitted that under the 
facts and circumstances of this case, the lower ecu u t''s oi der dismissing plaintiff " s 
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complaint and cause of action against Drs. Oldroyd and Money severally violated the 
plaintiffs constitutional rights to have her day in court to redress the very serious 
negligent injuries she sustained at the hands of the defendants. In the words of Dr. Ryser, 
her doctor, as a result of the defendants' negligent, even uncalled for operations, the 
plaintiff has a non functioning gut. 
This is a complicated case of medical malpractice. The defendants have a right to 
be extremely concerned about their liability to the plaintiff, but they do not have the right 
to have there liability to the plaintiff dismissed as a sanction under the rules of discovery, 
to shield themselves. The lower courts dismissal should be reversed by this court as a 
matter of law, and as a matter of abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Court of Appeals should reverse the lower court's error of dismissing 
plaintiffs complaint and causes of action against Dr. Oldroyd and Dr. Money and require 
the lower Court to proceed with the last order of the court of September 14,1998 
reopening discovery, and complete the case according to law. 
Plaintiff so prays. 
Dated this 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have served the foregoing document entitled Brief of 
Plaintifl7Appellant on the following person, by mailing two (2) copies to him by United 
States Mail, postage prepaid this / / Day of ^W^ ^1999, 
Curtis J. Drake 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees Drs. Oldroyd and Money 
Broadway Centre, Suite 900 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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